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Different models of political cycles emphasize either the "opportunistic"
or the "partisan" incentives of policymakers. In "opportunistic" models, the
policymakers maximize their popularity or their probability of reelection. In
"partisan" models different political parties represent the interests of
different constituencies and, when in office, follow policies which are
favorable to their supporting groups; specifically, the left wingparties are
more concerned with the problem of unemployment, while the right wing parties
are relatively more willing to bear the costs of unemployment to reduce
inflation.
This literature has developed in two clearly distinct phases. The first
one, in the mid—seventies, is due to the influential work by Nordhaus (1975),
and Lindbeck (1976) on "opportunistic" cycles and by Hibbs (1977)on
"partisan" cycles. These papers share a "pre—rational expectations" model of
the economy and are based upon an exploitable "Phillips curve". The"political
business cycle" model of Nordhaus predicts pre—electoral fastgrowth and low
unemployment; raising inflation around the election time and a post—electoral
recession, regardless of the political orientation of the incumbent. Hibbs'
partisan model implies systematic and permanent differences in the
inflation/unemployment combination chosen by different political parties.
Macroeconomists soon lost interest in this subject, because at that time
the profession was developing (or fighting against), the "rational
expectations revolution. "
The second phase took off in the mid—eighties as a branch of thegame—
theoretic approach to the positive theory of policy. Cukierman and Meltzer
(1986), Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990), and Persson and Tabellini
(1990) propose rational "opportunistic" models; Alesina (1987)develops a2
rational partisan approach. These models depart from their predecessors in
two important dimensions. First, the assumption of economic agents'
rationality makes real economic activity less directly and predictably
influenced by monetary policy. Second, voters' rationality implies that they
cannot be systematically "fooled" in equilibrium.
This second generation of models has empirical implications which are
quite different from those of the earlier literature: the assumption of
rationality reduces the extent and the likelihood of regular political cycles,
although it does not eliminate them. For example, in models with rational
economic agents and voters, Nordhaus' type cycles are mitigated. Rather than
regular multi—year cycles on output and unemployment, one should observe,
according for instance to Rogoff and Sibert (1988), short—lived electoral
cycles on monetary and fiscal policy instruments, but not necessarily on
economic activity outcomes. Alesina (1987, l988b) shows that in a partisan
model with nominal wage contracts and rational voters, permanently different
inflation rates across parties may result only in temporary, post—election
differences in output and unemployment.
Finally, Ito (l990a,b) and Terrones (1989) study political business
cycles with endogenous timing of elections, an institutional setting which is
very common in parliamentary democracies.
This paper addresses two questions. First, whether or not the dynamic
behavior of GNP growth, unemployment and inflation is systematically affected
by the timing of elections and of changes of governments. Second, whether or
not the second generation of rational models has provided useful insights to
interpret the evidence. The paper suggests an affirmative answer to both
these questions by examining 18 OECD democracies, in the last three decades.3
Our results can be summarized as follows: a) The "political business
cycle" hypothesis, as formulated in Nordhaus on output and unemployment is
generally rejected by the data. (Some favorable evidence can be found in only
two countries.) In every country, with the exception of Japan, we also reject
the extension of the "political business cycle" model, with endogenous timing
of elections; b) inflation tends to increase immediately after elections,
perhaps as a result of pre—electoral expansionary monetary and fiscal
policies; if confirmed by direct evidence on policy instruments, this result
yields support to the Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) model of
"political budget cycles"; (c) we find evidence of temporary partisan
differences in output and unemployment and of long—run partisan differences in
the inflation rate as implied by the "rational partisan theory" of Alesina
(1987). This pattern appears rather unambiguously in countries with a pure
two—party system, or with clearly identifiable "right" and "left" coalitions;
(d) we find virtually no evidence of permanent partisan differences in output
and unemployment. Indirectly, results (c) and (d) yield some support to the
positive model of inflation developed by Kydland—Prescott (1977) and Barro and
Gordon (l983a,b).
The qualitative features of these results are consistent with the finding
on the United States by Alesina and Sachs (1988), Alesina (l988a) and Chapell
and Keech (1988). The advantage of a multi—country study is that, of course,
one has many more degrees of freedom. Elections and changes of governments
are relatively infrequent events. Thus, the researcher is left with very few
observations and only one country is considered. This is why systematic
multi—country studies are particularly useful in this area.4
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we highlight the
empirical implications of several models of political cycles. Since several
comprehensive reviews of the literature have recently appeared (Alesina
(1988a), Nordhaus (1989), Persson and Tabellini (1990)) we sketch the various
models very succinctly. In Section 3 we present regressions on a panel data
set of all the countries in the sample. Section 4 discusses the results of
country by country regressions. Section 5 checks the robustness of our
results by employing Hamilton's (1989) method of timing recessions and
expansions. Section 6 considers the issue of endogenous timing of elections.
The last section concludes.
2. Models of Politico—Economic Cycles
2.1 The "Political Business Cycle" (Nordhaus (1975))
The assumptions underlying Nordhaus' "political business cycle"
(henceforth PEC) can be characterized as follows:
A.l) The economy is described by a Phillips curve:
—ay1
+ y(ir —ir)÷ 0 <a< 1; > 0. (1)
where y is output growth; iv is inflation; ,e is expected inflation; £ is a
random shock with zero mean; a, 7areparameters.2 The autoregressive term in
(1) captures various sources of persistence. The "natural" steady state level
of growth is normalized at zero, with no loss of generality.
A.2) Inflation expectations are adaptive:
—
'Tt—l+ A(,re1
—ic1).0 <A <1 (2)
A.3) Inflation is directly controlled by the policymakers.35
A.4) Politicians are "opportunistic": they only care about holding
office, and they do not have "partisan" objectives.
A.5) Voters are "retrospective." They judge the incumbent's performance
based upon output growth and inflation during the incumbents' term of office,
and heavily discount past observations.
A.6) The timing of elections is exogenously fixed.
Under these assumptions, Nordhaus derives the following testable
implications: (i) every government follows the same policy; (ii) towards the
end of his term of office, the incumbent stimulates the economy to take
advantage of the "short rum" more favorable Phillips curve; (iii) the rate of
inflation increases around the election time as a result of the pre—electoral
economic expansion; after the election, inflation is reduced with
contractionary policies A
Thisbasic model has recently been developed in two directions: first
by investigating the role of rationality and second the role of endogenous
timing of the elections. These two extensions are illustrated below.
2.2 Rational Political Business Cycle Models
Persson and Tabellini (1990) propose a simple model which summarizes the
basic insights of this approach, due to Rogoff and Sibert (1988). Assumptions
A.l, A.3, A.4, and A.6 as in Nordhaus are retained. Assumption A.2 is
replaced by:
A.2') ,1e —E(lrt/I
:rational expectations
A.2' ') includes all the relevant information except the level of
"competence" of different policymakers.6
Assumption A.5 is substituted by:
A.5') Voters choose the candidate which is rationally expected to deliver
the highest utility, if elected.
A.5'') There are no differences in voters' utility functions.
E(.) is the expectation operator and 'tl is the information set of the
voters at time (t—l) when expectations are formed. A.2'') implies an
asymmetry of information between the policymakers and the voters: the former
know their own competence, but the latter do not.5Policymakers' "competence"
is defined as their ability of keeping unemployment low witha relatively low
level of inflation.6
By taking advantage of this informational asymmetry, and by trying to
appear as competent as possible before elections, politicians behave in away
leading to a Nordhaus' type PBC. However, given voters' rationality and
awareness of politicians' incentives, the latter are limited in their
"opportunistic" behavior. Thus, the resulting cycles are more short lived and
less regular than in Nordhaus' model.
The original proponents of the "competence" model, i.e.Rogoff and Sibert
(1988) and Rogoff (1990), consider a budget problem, rather thanan
inflation/unemployment trade—off, but with identical assumptions about the
distribution of information. These papers have empiricalimplications on
opportunistic cycles on monetary and fiscal variables, rather thanon
unemployment and output. In fact, the model by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) has
implications on the inflation rate similar to those of Nordhaus'model, but
does not imply any correlation between elections andoutput or unemployment.7
2.3 Endogenous Elections
Ito (1990a,b) and Terrones (1989) remove assumption A.6: the latter
extends Rogoff's (1990) model, while Ito (l990a,b) presents a simpler model in
which while the policymakers are strategic in choosing the timing of
elections, the voters follow rules of thumb in their voting behavior, That
is, Ito maintains A.5, while Terrones adopts A.5' and A.5''. These papers
suggest that early elections are called to capitalize on good economic
conditions. Thus, the better the state of the economy, the sooner elections
are called.
Using Ito's simple and very insightful framework, suppose that the
government has no control on real economic activity and that voters' behavior
is described by A.5. Then, if high growth occurs soon after an election, the
incumbent may choose to call another election; if, instead, growth is low, he
waits: he has a good chance of capitalizing on a high growth period by
calling an election later in his term of office. However, as time elapses
from the previous election, the date at which an election has to be called
according to the law approaches. Then, even an average level of growth may
trigger an election; this is because the incumbent wants to avoid the risk of
reaching the last period with low growth. Thus, the probability that an
election is called should be an increasing function of the time elapsed from
the previous election and of the state of the economy.
2.4 The "Partisan Theory"; Hibbs (1977), (1987)
A strong version of the "partisan theory" (henceforth PT) based upon a
non—rational expectation mechanism, adopts assumptions A.l, A.2, A.3 and A.6.
Assumptions A.4 and A.5 are substituted by:8
A.4') Politicians are "partisan," in the sense that different parties
maximize different objective functions. Left wing parties attribute a higher
cost to unemployment relative to inflation than right wing parties.
A.5''') Each voter is aware of the partisan difference and votes for the
party which offers the most preferred policy.
The assumption of partisanship is justified by the distributional
consequences of unemployment. In periods of high (low) unemployment, low
(high) growth and low inflation the relative share of income of theupper
middle class, increases (decreases). On this point, see Hibbs (1987).
Not surprisingly, this model implies that different parties choose
different points on the Phillips curve: output growth and inflation should be
permanently higher and unemployment permanently lower when the left is in
office than with right wing governments.7
2.5 "Rational Partisan Theory" (Alesina (1987))
Alesina (1987) and (1988b) suggest a "rational partisan theory"
(henceforth RPT). This model adopts assumption A.l, A.2', A.3,A.4', A.5'''
and A.6. The objective functions of the two partiescan be written as:
Wi —
_o
—
ciJ2
—
bL{y
—
KiJ]
0 1; (3)
where i —L,Ridentifies the "left" and the "right" parties. The difference
between the two parties can be summarized by at leastone of these three sets
of inequalities:
cL>cR￿o; bL>bRO; KL>KRO (4)9
The last double inequality implies the time—inconsistency problem in monetary
policy pointed out by Kydland—Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (l983a,b).
Since at least one of the two parties targets a level of output growth which
is above the natural rate (normalized at zero), it introduces an "inflation
bias" because of the lack of precommitments in monetary policy. Thus, a test
of the RPT is indirectly a test for this specification of policymakers'
obj ective functions.
This model generates a political cycle if we assume that uncontingent
labor contracts are signed at discrete intervals (which do not coincide with
the political terms of office) and that electoral outcomes are uncertain
because of shocks to voters' preferences or to voters' participation rates in
elections. The basic idea of the model is that, given the sluggishness in
wage adjustments, changes in the inflation rate associated with changes in
government create temporary deviations of real economic activity from its
natural level.
More specifically, the following testable implications can be derived
from the model:(i) at the beginning of a right wing (left wing) government
output growth is below (above) its natural level and unemployment is above
(below); (ii) after expectations, prices and wages adjust, output and
unemployment return to their natural level; after this adjustment period, the
level of economic activity should be independent of the party in office;
(iii) the rate of inflation should remain higher throughout the term of a left
wing government; note that this occurs even if cL —cRin (3), as long as
KL >KRor bL >bR.That is, the time consistent (but sub—optimal) inflation
rate remains higher for left wing parties even after the level of economic
activity returns to its natural level.10
2.6 Previous Empirical Results
Most of the empirical studies on political cycles use post—war United
States data. The evidence in favor of the RPT is relatively strong; evidence
of "opportunistic" PEG is found for certain policy instruments (particularly
government transfers) for limited sub—samples: for recent surveys of this
empirical literature see Alesina (1988a) and Nordhaus (1989).
Multi—country studies are more scarce. Alt (1985) is the first one to
formally test for partisan patterns in unemployment in twelve OECD democracies
and finds evidence quite consistent with this approach. Paldam (1979) finds
very weak evidence (if any at all) of Nordhaus' political business cycle on
output and unemployment using a sample of seventeen OEGD countries. The same
author (l989a,b) finds stronger evidence of partisan effects using annual
data. Alesina (1989) provides some qualitative tests with annual data using
the same sample of countries; his results suggest that the RPT is broadly
consistent with the evidence while the same paper does not find clear evidence
of PEG on growth and unemployment. Alvarez, Garrett and Lange (1989)suggest
that the degree of success of "partisan policies"may depend upon the
characteristics of labor market institutions and of unions' behavior. On the
contrary, Sheffrin (1989) finds inconclusive results for the RPT. However,
Sheffrin's definition of TMunexpected change" of governments is questionable.
That paper disregards the fact that in several countries the sameparty or
coalition was elected repeatedly with no electoral uncertainty. (See Alesina
(1990)).
The contribution of the present paper is that, unlike its predecessors,
it considers all the different theories, including models with endogenous
elections, in a unified framework. Furthermore, unlike the recent work by11
Alesina and Paldam, we use quarterly data rather than annual data and make use
of different and more robust statistical tests. The use of quarterly data is
quite important since the precise timing of cyclical fluctuations in relation
to elections and changes in political regime is crucial for the theories.
3.Panel Regressions
3.1 Data
We consider all the OECD countries which have been democracies in the
sample period considered, which is 1960 to 1987. The extent of the sample is
limited by availability of quarterly data; in fact, for some countries not all
the series are available even for this period. The countries included are:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Cermany, Japan,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, and the United States.
The economic data are quarterly observations on inflation, output growth,
and unemployment. Inflation is defined as the yearly rate of change of the
CPI from IMF, IFS. Output growth is obtained as the rate of change of real
CNP (or CDP), also from IMF, IFS. For unemployment, we use the total
standardized unemployment rate from OECD. More details on country specific
data issues can be found in Table A—l in Appendix. The political data are
election dates, the dates of changes of governments, and the political
orientation of various governments. This information is summarized in Table
A—2. Dates of regime changes and elections do not always coincide in
parliamentary systems in which changes of coalitions take place not only after
elections. Sources for these political data are Alt (1985) and Banks (1987).
The identification of changes of political orientation of governments is12
usually unambiguous. Whenever ambiguities occurred in the case of large
coalition governments, we followed Alt's and Ranks' conventions. It should be
noted the countries for which positive results for the partisan theory are
found, are those in which there are no ambiguities about the classification of
government political orientation.
3.2 Specification of Empirical Tests
The most direct way of testing the various theories is to run the
following panel regressions of time—series cross—section data, for instance on
output growth:
—
a0+ +a2y2
...ay
+°n+lPDUM+ (5)
yt is the stacked vector of time—series data on output growth for the
countries in the sample and PDUM is a political dummy whichcaptures the
implications of the different theories. The autoregressive specification for
the dependent variable is chosen as the "best" using standardtechniques.
Similar regressions have been performed by McCallum (1978), Hibbs (1987),
Alesina and Sachs (1988) and Alesina (1988a) on U.S. data. These testsare
based upon the assumption that output growth and unemploymentare generated by
a covariance—stationary stochastic process that can be expressed in
autoregressive form as in (5).
Since the sample includes open economies (most of which are "small"),we
must control for the effect of the worldeconomy on domestic economies, for
two reasons. First, the "partisan" or opportunistic goals of thepoliticians
are likely to be defined, in small open economies, in relation to the rest of
the world. Second, regardless of the governments' goals, international trade13
and financial linkages make OECD economies highly interdependent.
We have followed two approaches to capture these effects. The first one
is to redefine each country's variable as a difference between the actual
variable and a proxy for the OECD average of the same variable. The second
one is to add as a regressor in eq. (5) a proxy for a world or OECD average.
Our results concerning the relative performance of various political models
are insensitive to the procedure used. As an indicator of an OECD average of
each economic variable we consider the average of the seven largest economies
in our sample, which are the USA, Japan, Germany, France, the lix, Italy, and
Canada, weighted by each country's share of GNP over the total.8
In the remainder of this section we present results of panel regressions
on the different political theories of the business cycle. We make use of a
fixed effect model with constant slopes. By doing so we take into account
differences in long—term growth rates, unemployment, and inflation across
countries but we assume that the other parameters of the model are constant
and equal across countries.9
3.3 The "Rational Partisan Theory" (RPT)
The political dummy used is:
+1 in the N quarters starting with that of
a change of government toward the right
DRPTN — —1 in the N quarters starting with that of
a change of government toward the left
0 otherwise
We tested the cases of N —4,6,8.This choice of number of quarters is
consistent with a wage contract model in which contracts have an average
length of 1 or 2 years.14
Note that the variable DRPTN assumes values different fromzero only
following actual changes of governments, but not afterevery election if the
same government is reappointed. According to the RPT theory, inflation
surprises and thus output fluctuations may occur even if an incumbent is
reappointed unexpectedly (Alesina, 1987). However, for long periods of time
in many countries in the sample certain partiesrepeatedly won elections with
virtually no political uncertainty. Furthermore, in countries with endogenous
timing of elections, which are the large majority of the sample (see Table A—
2), in every period there is at least "some" probability thatan election is
called and that a change of governmentmay occur.-0 In addition, in
parliamentary systems sometimes government changes occur in the middle ofa
term, with no elections. Rather than trying to estimate the degree of
political uncertainty in every period, which would be rather difficult ifnot
impossible, we have chosen to estimate a somewhat weaker form ofRPT, testing
for temporary effects on real variables after actual chaneesof governments.
An additional reason for doing so, is that severalmacroeconomic models in the
"neo—Keynesian" tradition, imply that not only unexpected, but alsoexpected
aggregate demand policy may have some real effects. Thus, according to these
approaches, stronger effects should found after actualchanges of governments,
with actual changes of policies, relative to thecase of reappointment of the
same government.
Column (1) of Table 1 reports the result of thedynamic panel OLS
regressions for the entire sample of countries and the timeperiod for which
data are available.11 Japan and Switzerlandare not included since they had
no political change in the sample. The dependent variabley is the rate of
x-x
CNPgrowth defined as: y — x
t—4
100where —levelof real GNP
t—4Table 1
Rational Partisan Theory
Dependent Variable: Rate of Growth of Output (Y)
Independent
(1)
Coefficient
(2)
Coefficient
Variables (t- statistics) (t- statistics)
Constant 0.13 -0.17
(0.52) (-0.78)
Y(-l) 0.713 0.610
(28.2) (17.28)
Y(-2) -0.062 -0.01
(-2.55) (-0.27)
YW 0.353 0.303
(11.80) (9.30)
DRPT6(-1) -0.40 -0.62
(-3.37) (-4.51)
USA -0.45 0.21
(-1.48) (0.82)
UK -0.63 -0.02
(-2.06) (-0.06)
Germany -0.36 0.29
(-1.18) (1.10)
France -0.14 0.50
(-0.44) (1.82)
Canada 0.13 0.83
(0.45) (3.14)
Italy 0.05
(0.17)
Sweden -0:55
(-1.62)
e1gium -0.42
(-1.38)
Austria 0.15
(0.49)Table 1 (continued)
Rational Partisan Theory
Dependent Variable: Rate of Growth of Output (Y)
Independent
(1)
Coefficient
(2)
Coefficient
Variables (t- statistics) (t-statistjcs)
Norway -0.02
(-0.09)
Finland 0.05
(0.16)
Ireland 0.46
(1.14)
Australia 0.03 0.71
(0.11) (2.67)
New Zealand -0.48 0.13
(-1.57) (0.49)
Denmark -0.39
(-1.28)
0.61 0.6015
in quarter t. •The regressors are self explanatory: yW is the world growth
average (described above); the AR(2) specification has been chosen as the
"best" using standard techniques; the remaining regressors are country
dummies.
The political dummy DRPT6 has the correct sign and is statistically
significant at the 1 percent confidence level: a change in government to the
right (left) leads to a transitory fall (increase) in output growth. The one
quarter lag in the political dummy is consistent with a reasonable interval
between change of regime (in quarter t) and change of policy (in period t+l).
The regressions with DRPT 4 and DRPT 8 (available upon request) yield
analogous results: the pattern of the coefficients suggests that partisan
effects are observable from about the second to the eighth/ninth quarters
after the election. These results are consistent with findings on United
States data by Alesina and Sachs (1988) and Alesina (1988a).12
In column 2 of the same table we present the result of the same
regression for a subset of countries which have either a "pure" two—party
system or at least more clearly identifiable "left" and "right" coalitions.
These are US, UK, France, Germany, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, and Canada.
The other countries in the sample have more fragmented political systems with
govertiments formed with large coalitions of parties (often center—left) which
sometimes are short lived and unstable. For obvious reasons, the second group
of countries is less likely to exhibit regular partisan cycles. In the second
regression, in fact, the coefficients on the political dummy are much larger
in absolute value and even more precisely estimated.16
The values of the coefficients in the second column of Table 1 imply that
about eighteen months after a change of regime toward the right (left) the
rate of growth of CNP is about 1.3 percent below (above) "normal". Thus, the
difference in the rate of growth between the beginning of a leftwing
government and the beginning of a right wing government reaches a peak of
about 2.6 percent.
In Table 2 the dependent variable is the difference (U1') between the
domestic unemployment rate, (Ut) and the "OECD unemploymentrate," UW,
defined analogously to the average GNP growth. Inevaluating results on
employment one has to be cautious because of problems of hysteresis (see
Blanchard and Summers, 1986). By taking the difference of domestic
unemployment from a world weighted average, unit roots problems are somewhat
mitigated, but certainly not eliminated. Table 2 shows results which are
quite consistent with those on GNP growth. The political dummy is significant
at the 1 percent level and the fit improves when the sample is restrictedto
seven bi—partisan countries (note that New Zealand is missing from these
regressions because of lack of quarterly unemployment data). Thedummy DRPT6
is lagged two quarters to capture the slowresponse of unemployment to policy
changes relative to output. In any case, analogous results (availableupon
request) are obtained if this variable is lagged only onequarter or when
DRPT4 and DRPT8 are used. The values of the coefficients in thesecond column
of Table 2 imply that about six quarters aftera change of regime toward the
right (left) the unemployment rate is about 1.5percentage points above
(below) normal)-3Table 2
Test of Rational Partisan Theory
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2)
Variable Coefficient Coefficient
(t-statistic) (t-statistic)
Constant 0.153 0.101
(3.38) (2.96)
UDIF(_l) 1.286 1.334
(48.41) (39.50)
U1(-2) -0.301 -0.361
(-11.25) (-10.58)
DRPT6(-2) 0.057 0.083
(2.85) (3.10)
Australia -0.127 -0.082
(-2.15) (-1.67)
Austria -0.218
(-3.32)
Belgium -0.031
(-0.57)
Canada -0.130 -0.053
(-2.35) (-1.23)
Denmark -0.094
(-1.52)
Finland -0.164
(-2.81)
France -0.110 -0.06
(-1.83) (-1.25)
Cermany -0.140 -0.116
(-2.31) (-2.16)
Ireland 0.071
(1.03)
Italy -0.074
(-1.32)Table 2 (continued)
Test of Rational Partisan Theory
Dependent Variable: UDIF
(1) (2)
Variable CoeffIcient Coefficient
(t-statistjc) (t-statjstjc)
Norway -0.218
(-3.15)
Sweden -0.208 -0.198
(-3.32) (-3.32)
UK -0.133 -0.082
(-2.35) (-1.80)
USA -0.139 -0.059
(-2.49) (-1.37)
0.99 0.9817
Let us now turn to inflation. The theory implies that one should observe
permanent differences across governments on the inflation rate. Thus, we have
defined a political dummy, RADM, as follows:
÷1 if a right wing government is in office, includ-
ing the quarter of the change of government
RADM —
—1 if a left wing government is in office includ-
ing the quarter of the change of government,
In Table 3 the dependent variable is domestic inflation (it)definedas the
cpI —cPI
rateof change of CPI: —t
100 .Thevariable for world
t—4
inflation (,iM) is defined analogously to the world output growth. 14
In the first regression, which includes the entire sample of countries,
the sign of the coefficient on RADM(—1) is correct and it is marginally
insignificant at the 10 percent level Ct ——1.55).The second regression
includes only the eight "bi—partisan" countries: here the coefficient on
RADM(—l) is larger and significant at the 5 percent level.
The value of the coefficients in the second regressions imply a
difference in the steady state inflation rate between the two regimes of about
1.4 percent. This relatively low value reflects the fact that our sample
includes the sixties, with a low and stable inflation and countries, such as
Germany, with a low inflation rate throughout the sample period. We have run
the same regressions of Table 3 for the post—fixed exchange rates regimes,
from 1972.1 to 1987.4. In these regressions (available upon request) the
coefficient on the RADM dummy is more precisely estimated and implies (in the
sample of 8 "bi—partisan" countries) a difference in the inflation rate across
political regimes of about 2.5 percent.Table 3
Rational Partisan Theory
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2)
Variable Coefficient Coefficient
(t-statistic) (t-statjstic)
Constant -0.082 0.589
(-0.69) (4.78)
ir(-l) 1.085 1.210
(45.55) (35.26)
ir(-2) -0.137 -0.272
(-3.92) (-5.16)
r(-3) -0.097 -0.075
(-4.34) (-2.31)
rW 0.146 0.127
(13.20) (9.38)
RADM(-l) -0.05 -0.082
(-1.55) (-2.13)
Australia 0.332 -0.306
(2.18) (-2.27)
Austria -0.062
(-0 .40)
Belgium 0.031
(0.20)
Canada 0.08 -0.574
(0.52) (-3.94)
Denmark 0.358
(2.31)
Finland 0.41
(2.69)
France 0.336 -0.294
(2.19) (-2.19)
Germany -0.251 -0.853
(-1.64) (-5.68)Table 3 (continued)
Rational Partisan Theory
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2)
Variable Coefficient Coefficient
(t-statistic) (t-statistic)
Ireland 0.66
(4.25)
Italy 0.673
(4.19)
New Zealand 0.67
(4.29)
Norway 0.304
(1.98)
Sweden 0.270 -0.403
(1.74) (-2.82)
UK 0.522 -0.14
(3.38) (-1.04)
USA -0.037 -0.65
(-0.24) (-4.55)
R2 0.94 0.9518
In fact, we have tested whether all theregressions of Tables 1, 2 and 3
improve in the post 1971 period, since in the fixedexchange rate period
(1960—71 in our sample) the macroeconomic policies ofeach countries were more
constrained and integrated. All the t—statisticson the political dummies
improve and the value of the coefficients increase in absolutevalue in the
post 1971 regressions, which are available. However, theproblem in pursuing
this comparison, pre and post—1971, is that thereare very few changes of
regimes in this period (see Table A—i); inmany countries there are changes
of regimes in the sixties. Thus, thepolitical dummies pre—1971 regression
would be very imprecisely estimated and hardto compare with the post—1971
sample.
In summary, these results are favorableto the RPT. The implication of
this hypothesis is not rejected on both thelevel of economic activity (growth
and unemployment) and inflation,particularly for a sub—set of countries with
more clearly identifiable government changes from leftto right and vice
versa. 15
3,4 "Partisan Theory" with PermanentEffects
Hibbs' PT implies permanent differencesin output and unemployment in
addition to permanent differences ininflation across governments. Thus, one
way of comparing the Hibbs' PT with the RPT is torun the same regressions of
Tables 1 and 2 using the "permanent"
partisan dummy RADM rather than the
"transitory" political dummy DRPTN. The resultsare shown in Tables 4 and 5:
all the coefficients on the politicaldummy are insignificant, even though
with the right sign. In these tablesthe fixed effects coefficients are not
reported since they are very similar to those ofTables 1 and 2.AdditionalTable 4
Partisan Theory(Hibbs)
Dependent Variable:Y
Variable *
(1)
Coefficient
(t-statistjc)
(2)
Coefficient
(t-statistjc)
Constant 0.13
(0.52)
-0.18
(-0.80)
Y(-l) 0.720
(28.47)
0.629
(17.76)
Y(-2) -0.061
(-2.53)
-0.01
(-0.27)
YW 0.349
(11.63)
0.289
(8.78)
RADM(-l) -0.04
(-0.71)
-0.03
(-0.47)
R2 0.61 0.59
Theestimated regression includes fixed effects *
reportedin the tableTable 5
Partisan Theory (Hibbs)
Dependent Variable : UDIF
(1) (2)
Variable * Coefficient Coefficient
Ct-statistics) (t-statistics)
Constant 0.15 0.010
(3.27) (0.31)
uT(_l) 1.29 1.40
(48.8) (39.97)
U(-2) -0.31 -0.43
(-11.5) (-12.0)
RADM(-l) 0.0094 0.0077
(0.86) (0.62)
0.98 0.98
*Theestimated regression includes country fixed effects that
are not reported in the table.19
regressions with alternative lag structures (for instance lagging RADM more
than one quarter) yield no support for the theory.
The results of section 3.2 and 3.3 viewed together, indirectly provide
some empirical support to the inflation bias model of Kydland and Prescott
(1977) and Barro and Cordon (l983a,b). In fact, these regressions show that a
permanent difference in inflation rate is associated with temporary deviations
of output and unemployment from trend. Thus, the governments that are more
concerned about growth and unemployment relative to inflation, after a
temporary initial expansion, are caught in the sub—optimal equilibrium with an
inflation bias. In fact, inflation remains high even though the level of
economic activity returns to its "natural" value. This is precisely the
feature of the sub—optimal time consistent equilibrium.
3.5 The "Political Business Cycle"
Nordhaus' (1975) PBC model can be tested on growth and unemployment by
constructing a political dummy of the following form:
1 in the (N—I) quarters preceding an election
NRDN — andin the election quarter
C otherwise
We have chosen N —4,6 and 8. A relatively short pre—electoral output
expansion is consistent with this theory based upon a short sighted
electorate, Nordhaus (1975, 1989). Furthermore, since in many countries in
the sample several elections occur in less than fouryear intervals, a longer
specification of the preelectoral period would seem unreasonable.20
Tables 6 and 7 report the results onoutput and unemployment for the 18
countries in the sample, using NRD6. (The fixedeffect coefficients are not
reported.) In both tables the coefficients areinsignificant; in the growth
regression the coefficient has the opposite sign from the
theory prediction.
Several alternative specifications with NRD4 andNRD8, using the difference of
domestic growth from the world as thedependent variable and alternative lag
structures, yield no support for the theory.16 In fact, thecoefficient on
the political dummy has the "wrong"sign in the majority of the regressions.
We also tested whether the bIRD dummyapproaches statistical significance,
when partisan effects are held constant.Regressions including both the DRPT
and the NRD dunjnies were run. Onceagain no support for the PBC was found,
while the DRPT dummy remained
statistically significant (results are
available) 17
The PBC not only as formulated in Nordhaus(1975) but also, with caveats
discussed above, in the "rational" modelsby Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and
Persson and Tabeilini (1990) impliesan increase of the inflation rate around
elections. In particular, the modelby Rogoff and Sibert (1988) implies that
pre—electoral manipulation ofmonetary and fiscal policy, used to signal the
government competence in providing publicgoods and services without raising
taxes implies an increase of inflationimmediately after each election.
Furthermore, governments may prefer to raiseprices under their direct control
after, rather than before elections, thus
directly contributing to a post
electoral upward jump in inflation. Wehave tested this implication in Table
8, where the dummy ELE is defined as follows:
1 in the 4 quarters following an election, and in
ELE — theelection quarter.
10 otherwiseTable 6
Test For Political Business Cycle Theory
Dependent Variable: Y
Variable *
(1) (2)
Coefficient Coefficient
(t-statistjc) (t-statistjc)
Constant 0.13 -0.19
(0.52) (-0.81)
Y(-l) 0.732 0.631
(29.49) (17.27)
Y(-2) -0.059 -0.015
(-2.48) (-0.43)
YW 0.344 0.280
(12.03) (8.47)
NRD6 -0.11 0.06
(-0.97) (0.49)
R2 0.65 0.60
* Theestimated
reported in the
regression includes country fixed effects that are
table.
not
Table 7
Political Business Cycle Theory
Dependent Variable: U°
Variable *
(1) (2)
Coefficient Coefficient
(t-statistic) (t-statistic)
Constant 0.167 0.020
(3.77) (0.68)
1.323 1.433
(50.98) (39.67)
-0.335 -0.446
(-12.79) (-12.08)
NRD6 -0.014 -0.001
(-0.80) (-0.63)
0.99 0.98
*Theestimated regression includes country fixed effects that are not
reported in the table.Table 8
Political Business Cycle
Dependent Variable: i
Variable * Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant
ir(-l)
ir(-2)
ir(-3)
ELE
R2
-0.129
(-1.06)
1.078
(46. 93)
-0.114
(-3.40)
-0.111
(-5.17)
0.141
(13.12)
0.263
(4.67)
0.93
* Theestimated regression includes country fixed
reported in the table.
effects that are not21
The dummy ELE is significant at the one per cent level. Additional
regressions (available upon request) confirm that the upward jump in inflation
does not occur before the election, but only in the election quarter and lasts
three to five quarters. If confirmed by direct findings on policy
instruments, this result suggests that around elections monetary and fiscal
policy instruments may be manipulated, even though these policies do not seem
to affect real economic activity, as implied by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and
Rogoff (1990). Alesina (1989) presents some qualitative evidence which
suggests the possibility that budget deficits increase in election years.
4. Country Results
In this section we analyze country by country results, starting with the
RPT.Table9 reports the results on CNP growth. For each country in the
sample we report the regression with the best fit chosen between the six
dummies DRPTN(—J) with N —4,6,8and J —1,2.Countries may differ with
regard to the time delay in implementing a new policy after a regime change or
with regard to how persistent the transitory increase in output will be after
the policy change. This is the reason why the best fit for DRPTN might occur
at different lags for different countries. For economy of space, we report
the results on unemployment in Appendix (Table A—3) without comments. The
results of Table 9 are very consistent with those on unemployment: the rare
differences will be pointed out. Table 10 displays the results on inflation.
We report the "best fit" within five regressions with R.ADM(—J) J —1,...5.
Longer lags in the inflation regression, relative to the growth regression,
can be easily explained by the lag between output and inflation movementsTable 9
Rational Partisan Theory
Dependent Variable: Y
(t-statistjcs in parentheses)
Country ConstantY(-l) Y(-2) YW DRPT6(-l) DRPT(-J) ** R2 D.J.
Australia 0.236 0.595 0.374 -0.427 (8,2) 0.562.03
(0.58) (8.41) (3.82) (-1.09)
Austria -0.437 0.848 -0.169 0.544-1.207 0.634 2.06
(-0.550) (8.954) (-1.822) (2.738) (-l.389)
Belgiurn* -1.520 0.580 0.147 0.831 -0.027 (8,2) 0.697 2.15
(-2.602) (6.328) (1.381) (5.309) (-0.061)
Canada 0.387 0.709-0.234 0.533 -0.469 (4,2) 0.716 1.95
(1.237) (7.621) (-2.822) (5.592) (-1.220)
Denmark -0.0080776 -0.124 0.298 -0.467 (4,1)0.672.02 (-0.02) (8.25) (1.35) (3.61) (-1.37)
Finland 1.035 0.362 0.184 0.199 -0.852 (8,2) 0.312.08
(L56) (2.91) (1.49) (1.38) (-1.65)
France* 0.016 0.282 0.200 0.334 -0.802 (4,1) 0.446 1.88
(0.033) (2.566) (1.807) (3.103) (-1.390)
Germany -0.406 0.525 0.492 -0.699 (8,2) 0.656 2.01
(-1.211) (7.725) (5.228) (-2.418)
Ireland -0.649 0.491 1.137-1.190 0.621,82 (-0.59)(4.06) (3.00) (-1.44)
Italy 0.251 0.942 -0.234 0.275 -0.205 (4,].) 0.65 2.10
(0.40) (9.82) (-2.45) (2.09) (-0.249)Table 9 (continued)
Country const Y(-l) Y(-2) YW DRPT6(-1) DRPTN(-J) R2 D.W.
Netherlands -1.683
(.3.405)
0.513 0.151
(5.407) (1.734)
0.838
(6.201)
0.076 (4,1)
(0.156)
0.7581.94
New Zealand -0.077
(-0.282)
0.836 -0.059
(8.40) (-0.61)
0.175
(2.77)
-0.542 (8,1)
(-1.91)
0.76 1.93
Norway 0.819
(2.66)
0.859-0.141
(8.88) (-1.45)
-0.093
(1.75)
-0.265 (4,1)
(.1.21)
0.642.01
Sweden 0.667
(1.55)
0.461
(4.48)
0.158
(1.47)
-1.226
(-2.23)
0,35 1.95
UK 0.214
(0.569)
0.502
(6.121)
0.262
(2.695)
-0.455 (8,2)
(-1.365)
0.4251.87
UK (***) -0.018
(-0.043)
0.533 -0.144
(4.513) (-1.294)
0.455
(3.541)
-0.902 (8,2)
(-2.03)
0.5201.96
USA 0.362
(1.34)
1.068 -0.375
(11.95) (-4.47)
0.154
(2.20)
-0.894
(-3.63)
0.802.14
(*) In the regressions for these countries a third lag of the dependent variable was
significant, and was included. For France its coefficients were 0.183 (1.721); for
Belgium -0.241 (-2.937).
(**) In the regressions where DRPTN(-J) is used the two figures in parenthesis after the
coefficient estimate represent the horizon of the dummy variable (N —4,6, 8) and the lag
in DRPTN chosen in the regression. For example (8,2) in the Australian regression means
that we used DRPT8(-2).
(***) Sample period: 1970:1-1987:4.Table 10
Partisan Theory
Dependent Variable: ,r
Ct-statistics in parentheses)
Country Constant ,rW RADM(-1) RADM(-i) RZ OW
Australia
Austria (f)
0.365 0,151 1.114 -0.267 -0.291
(1.679> (3.500) (11.954) (-3.075) (-2.396)
0.472 0.132 0.848 -0.112 0.010
(1.922) (3.209> (8.817) (-1.201) (-0.064)
0.948 2.039
0.835 1.939
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
0.004 0.141 1.153 -0.309
(0.024) (3.908) (12.416) (-3.646)
0.035 0.132 1.162 -0.300
(0.325> (4.482) (12.648) (-3.583)
1.066 0.302 0.816 -0.210
(3.205) (4.339) (8.622)(-2.392)
0.285 0.173 1.205 -0.373
(1.279> (3.560) (13.416) (-4.400)
0.540 0.272 1.066 -0.330 -0.308
(2.868) (5.997) (11.634) (-4.231) (-2.630)
0.309 0.029 1.100 -0.234
(2.136) (1.316) (11.615) (-2.543)
-0.101 0.544 0.674 0.012 -0.135
(-0.308) (6.576) (7.177)(0.147) (-0.777)
-0.179 0.226 1.265 -0.386 -0.156
(-0.727) (4.007)(14.461) (-4.858) (-0.982)
0.121 0.111 0.835 0.009 -0.003
(0.361) (2.616) (8.590) (0.096> (-0.017)
0.2430.952
(0.289)
-0.0140.973
(-0.212)
-0.4570.828
(-2.920)
0.1190.938
(-0.940)
-0.1640.928
(-1.881)
0.932 2.011
0.967 1.951
0.851 1.964
Belgium (a)
Canada (c)
Denmark (b)
Finland (a)
France
Germany (d, a)
1.967
2 .065
2.032
2.049
0.970 1.677
1.987Table 10 (continued)
Country ConstantrW 7r '-z RADM(1)RADM(i) R2 D.W.
New Zealand (d) 0.615
(1.846)
0.137
(2.908)
1.368
(14.736)
-0.504
(-5.649)
-0.263
(-1.478)
0.940 1.794
Norway 0.487
(1.957)
0.136
(3.391)
1.076
(11.724)
-0.255
(-2.906)
-0.037
(-0.324)
0.889 2.125
Sweden (a) 0.537
(1.489)
0.206
(4.677)
0.823
(8.750)
-0.064
(-0.727)
0.082
(0.507)
0.887 1.994
UK (d) -0.022
(-0.094)
0.342
(5.483)
1.241
(15.072)
-0.461
(-6.223)
-0.173
(-1.395)
0.958 2.057
UK (d, g) 0.487
(1.094)
0.349
(4.581)
1.252
(12.559)
-0.505
(-5.572)
-0.483
(-2.397)
0.948 2.126
USA (c) 0.112
(0.927)
0.058
(1.933)
1.373
(15.539)
-0.460
(-5.533)
-0.108
(-1.660)
0.965 2.120
(a) RADM(-5)
(b)RADM(-4)
(c) RADM(-3)
(d) RADM(-2)
(e) Germany had a large coalition of right and left parties between 66:4 and 69:1; also,
following Alt (1985), the entrance of the FOP in the Social Democratic government in 72:3
is considered a movement to the right. To consider the movement from the right to center-
left in the 66-69 period and from left to center in the 72-82 period, the variable RADM
assumesthe value of -0.5 (instead of -1.0) in the first period and the value of -0.5
(instead of -1.0) in the second period. This finer variable (ADM) is lagged five quarters
i.e. (-5).
(f) For analogous reasoning to those ascribed to Germany, we used the ADM variable for
Austria.
(g) Sample period: 1970:1-1987:422
following changes in macroeconomic policies. The results can be summarized in
three points:
1) In a large group of countries which includes Australia, Denmark, Germany,
France, New Zealand, the US, and the UK, all the regressions on growth,
inflation and also unemployment (see Table A—3) show clear evidence of RPT,
although not all the coefficients on the political variables are significant
at the usual confidence levels (5 or 10 percent) in every regression. Note
that Table A—3 shows that the regressions on unemployment for Australia,
Denmark, France, Germany and the U.S. show a five percent level of
significance on the coefficient on the political dummy (Table A—3). The
results on the UK are greatly strengthened if the sample is restricted to the
post—fixed rates period. The regressions on the sample 1970—1987 in Tables 9
and 10 show significant coefficients on the political dummy at the 5percent
level. The significant difference between the pre— and post—1971 results for
the UK is explained primarily by the observation of the laborgovernment
elected in October 1964. This government, constrained by a commitment not to
devalue the pound, could not pursue expamsionary policies. Thus, 13K growth in
this period (1964—66) does not outperform the relatively rapid OECDaverage
growth.
2) In a second group of countries which includes Austria, Belgium, Finland,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the coefficients on the political
dummies exhibit the sign predicted by the theory sometimesapproaching
statistical significance, in either the growth or unemploymentregressions
(Table A—3) but no significance in the inflation regression. In particular,
Sweden has a five percent significant coefficient on DRPT6 in thegrowth
equation.23
3) Canada and Italy show no significant coefficients inany regressions. The
case of Canada, however, is explained by the almost perfect correlation
between the US and Canadian business cycle. In fact the USpolitical dummies
are statistically quite significant (five percent confidence level) in the
Canadian equations!1-8 Thus, it is not clear whether for thepurpose of this
paper Canada really provides an independent observation.
In summary, leaving aside Canada, six of the seven countrieswith more
clearly identifiable left—right governments (that is the US,Cermany, France,
the UK, Australia, and New Zealand) plus Denmark exhibitevidence of RPT
effects. One bi—partisan system, Sweden, is unclear. Allthe multi—party
parliamentary systems with large coalition governments show littlesign of
this type of cycle, particularly on inflation.19
Let us now turn to PT with permanent effects: Table 11reports the
country by country results on CNP growth. For each country we have chosen the
best fit between three regressions with politicaldummy RADM(—J) J —1,2,3.
The results for unemployment, which quite consistentwith those on output, are
in the Appendix (Table A—4). Only Cermany doesnot reject the PT. For Sweden
the coefficient is borderline significant, but thereis no indication of
partisan behavior in either unemployment (Table A—4) or inflation(Table 10).
All the other countries clearly reject thetheory; in several cases the
coefficient on the political dummy js opposite to thetheory prediction.
Table 12 reports country by country resultson output for the PEC model;
results on unemployment are in Table A—S. In Table 12we have chosen the best
specification between NRD4 an4 6.In four countries, Cermany, Japan, UK and
New Zealand the coefficient on NRD issignificant. In Australia and France
the coefficients have the sign inconsistentwith the theory and areTable 11
Partisan Theory (Hibbs)
Dependent Variable:Y
(t-statistics in parentheses)
-0.434 1.149 -0.416 -0.162
(1.46) (12.77) (-4.75) (-1.26)
0.130 0.542 -0.079 0.150
(0.33) (5.51) (-0.84) (0.78)
-0.286 0.857 -0.164 0.137
(-0.31) (9.00) (-1.75) (0.26)
-0.032 0.780 -0.135 -0.092
(-0.10) (8.24) (-1.47) (-0.61)
-0.795 0.870 -0.141 -0.042
(2.57) (8.98) (-1.43) (-0.41)
0.328 0.706 0.706 -0.244
(1.02) (7.54) (7.54) (-2.95)
-1.910 0.593 -0.051 -0.297
(-3.36) (6.50) (-0.62) (-1.11)
-0.73￿ 0.464 0.064 -0.498
(-2.02) (4.73) (0.75) (-2.32)
0.238 0.946 -0.232 0.057
(0.37) (9.96) (-2.43) (0.1.4)
-1.679 0.511 0.149 0.020
(-3.37) (5.40) (1.72) (0.07)
0.335 0.602 -0.007 -0.126
(0.79) (6.21) (-0.079) (-0.61)
-0.107 0.867 -0.036 0.067
(-0.38) (8.69) (-0.36) (0.65)
0.853 0.339 0.163 -0.563
(1.28) (2.65) (1.31) (-1.63)
0.267 0.337 0.246 0.294
(0.57) (3.17) (2.34) (1.06)
0.658 0.461 -0.015 -0.444
(1.43) (3.76) (-0.12) (-1.69)
-0.349 0.555 -0.127 -0.615
(-0.30) (3.46) (-0.88) (-1.05)
0.111
(1.52)
0. 299
(2.97)
0.464
(2.20)
0.299
(3.57)
0.086
(1.61)
0.547
(5.72)
0.909
(5.93)
0.581
(5.67)
0.286
(2. 26)
0.837
(5.97)
0.378
(3.78)
0.142
(2.17)
0.231
(1.54)
0.272
(2.60)
0.118
(1.07)
1.123
(2. 82)
Jn order to maintain consistency with the RPT inflationregressions, Cermany and Austria.
USA
Country Constant '-2 RADM(-I) N R2 D.W.
(-1) 0.78 2.12
UK
Austria*
De nxnark
1orway
Canada
Be 1 giuln
Cermany*
Italy
Netherlands
Australia
New Zealand
Finland
France
Sweden
Ireland
(-3)
(-1)
(-1)
(-1)
(-2)
(-3)
(-3)
(-1)
(-1)
(-3)
(-1)
(-1)
(-1)
(-1)
(-1)
0.42 1.97
0.63 2.06
0.66 2.03
0.63 2.02
0.71 1.94
0.68 1.98
0.65 1.91
0.65 2.11
0.76 1.93
0.55 2.03
0.75 1.99
0.31 2.05
0.42 2.09
0.33 1.88
0.61 2.01
we used ADM forTable 12
t'olit:iculBusiness Cycle Theory
DependentVariable: Y
(t-statisticsin parentheses)
Country Const Yt2 t4RD(J) YW R2
Us 0.247 1.139 -0.384 0.334 (6) 0.101 0.78
(0.83) (12.21) (-4.20) (1.22) (1.31)
UK -0.062 0.517 -0.099 0.737 (6) 0.317 0.45
(-0.16) (5.03) (-1.05) (1.72) (3.16)
Austria -0.392 0.863 -0.168 0.129(4) 0.484 0.623
(-0.423) (8.565) (-1.734) (0.135) (2.363)
Denmark 0.112 0.758 -0.150 -0.105 (6) 0.330 0.657
(0.323) (7.739) (-1.601) (-0.334) (3.739)
Norway 0.964 0.847 -0.144 -0.006 (6) 0.086 0.613
(3.043) (8.450) (-1.437) (-0.027) (1.602)
Canada 0.401 0.742 -0.258 0.081 (6) 0.510 0.72
(1.24) (7.73) (-3.03) (0.25) (5.15)
e1gium -1.774 0.628 -0.073 -0.287 (4) 0.873 0.690
(-2.930) (6.594) (-0.845) (-0.670) (5.630)
Germany -0.961 0.463 0.051 0.905 (6) 0555 0.66
(-2.37) (4.58) (0.58) (2.56) (5.47)
Italy 0.246 0.948 -0.238 -0.100 (4) 0.284 0.646
(0.356) (9.638) (-2.368) (-0.153) (2.145)
Netherlands -1.579 0.506 0.159 -0.256 (6) 0.839 0.76
(-2.95) (4.97) (1.71) (-0.51) (6.06)
Australia 0.884 0.569 0.028 -0.806 (6) 0.327 0.59
(1.72) (5.71) (0.30) (-2.12) (3.39)
New Zealand -0.253 0.790 -0.012 0.780 (4) 0.154 0.76
(-0.86) (7.74) (0.12) (2.885) (2.46)
Finland 0.194 0.431 0.205 1.071 (4) 0.240 0.33
(0.23) (3.27) (1.53) (1.28) (1.50)
Sweden 0.405 0.528 0.024 0.660 (4) 0.096 0.33
(0.80) (4.10) (0.19) (1.22) (0.81)
Ireland -0.710 0.588 -0.148 0.512 (4) 1.203 0.60
(-0.55) (3.58) (0.95) (0.34) (2.86)
France 0.498 0.317 0.270 -0.720 0.308 0.42
(0.95) (2.80) (2.52) (-1.28) (2.741)
Japan 0.147 0.835 0.031 0.627(6) 0.124 0.811
(0.350) (8.297) (0.322) (1.775) (1.343)
Switzerland -1.201 0.614 0.144 0.501 (4) 0.499 0.696
(-2.252) (5.062) (1.235) (0.788) (3.968)24
statistically significant (or close to it) .Allthe other coefficients are
insignificant.
Table 13 reports the country results on inflation. Several countries,
such as Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, and New Zealand show significant (ten
percent or better) post—electoral upward jumps in the inflation rate. In
several other countries (e.g., Japan, Norway, and UK) the sign is correct but
the t—statistic does not reach a significant level. Thus, in only two
countries, Germany and New Zealand, both the level of economic activity and
the inflation rate follow the predictions of Nordhaus' "political business
cycle" model.
5. Tests of the RPT model using Hamilton's (1989) model.
It would be interesting to derive direct measures of the dating of the
business cycle in different countries and study their relation to the
political variables. Obtaining estimates of the dating of the business cycle
is not easy, either empirically or conceptually. The empirical problem is
that, while in the United States the NBER offers already—made estimates of the
peaks and troughs of economic activity, similar and comparable measures are
not available for the other OECD countries. From a conceptual point of view,
the recent literature on unit roots and GNP has offered a number of
alternative approaches to the problem of distinguishing between trend and
cyclical components of output. Most of the literature20 is based on the
assumption that GNP growth is characterized by a linear stationary process.
In a recent paper, Hamilton (1989) studies the implications of specifying
the first differences of log GNF as a nonlinear stationary process.
Hamilton's idea is to consider the economy as characterized by two states, aT
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high—growth (expansion) state and a low—growth (recession) state and model the
switch between these two states as being governed by a Markov process. One of
the bi—products of the estimation of the model is a nonlinear filter that
delivers optimal estimates of the dating of the business cycle based on past
observations on output. In particular, for each quarter the filter provides
an estimate of the probability that the economy is in a recession (or a boom)
given the information available in the data. Using this filter, Hamilton
(1989) finds that "the best statistical estimates of which quarters were
historically characterized by negative growth states for the U.S. economy are
remarkably similar to NBER dating of business cycles". These results suggest
that one could use the same statistical approach to derive estimates of the
dating of the business cycle for other OECD countries in our sample.
In this sectiàn we first derive estimates of the dating of the peaks and
troughs of the business cycle for a sample of OECD economies using Hamilton's
switching Markov model and then test the relation between these estimates of
the business cycle and the changes in political regime suggested by the RPT
model. Our use of Hamilton's approach is suggested by its success in tracking
the NEER dating of the business cycle in the United States and its ability to
deliver a synthetic estimate for each quarter of the probability that the
economy was in a high growth (expansion) or low growth (recession) state.
Given the positive evidence in favor of the RPT model for countries with
two—party systems we have considered only these countries.21 To control for
the effects of the world business cycle on the growth rate of the various
economies, in our maximum likelihood estimates of Hamilton's model we take
yDIF (defined as the difference betweencountry i growth rate and the average26
growth rate of the major OECD countries) as the two—state variable to be
explained.
Once we have obtained an estimate of the dating of the business cycle, we
perform a regression of the estimated probability (PROBS) of being in a low
growth state (relative to the OECD average) on a constant, the dummy for the
RPT model (DRPTN) and the first lag of the dependent variable. The latter is
introduced to capture the observed persistence of the probability of being in
a particular state of the world. In other terms the basic regressions is:
PROBSt — +a1 PROBSt 1 + °2 DRPTNt 1 + t (6)
Table 14 reports the results of fixed—effects panel regressions of
equation (6) above for 7 "bi—partisan" countries22. The political variable
(DRPT6), used to capture the effects of the RPT model, has the correct sign
and is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.
In Table 15 we report the results of separate time series regressions for
each of the seven countries considered. The coefficient on the RPT dummy
(DRPT) is significant at the 10% confidence level in five of the seven
countries (5% for United States, France and Sweden). These five countries
are: United States, Germany, France, Australia and Sweden. The DRPT
coefficient for the United Kingdom is significant (at the 10% level) only if
we start the sample in 1970 (as discussed above). The seventh country, Canada
does not show statistical significance for the RPT variable but, as discussed
in the previous section, the Canadian business cycle is mostly driven by the
U.S. cycle.Table 14
Test of the RPT Model Using
Hamiltons Filter For the Business Cycle
Dependent Variable: Probability of being in a low (relative toaverage OECD) growth state.
Panel regressions on seven bi-partisan countries.
Estimated
Variable Coefficient t-statistjcs
Constant 0.09 4.74
PROBS(t-1) 0.82 38.43
DRPT6 0.046 3.10
United States -0.08 -3.26
Germany 0.05 2.33
France 0.002 0.01
Australia -0.024 -1.05
Canada -0.020 -0.891
Sweden -0.029 -1.14
—0.80
D.W. —1.97Table 15
Test of the RFT Model Using
Hamiltons Filter for the Business Cycle
Dependent Variable: Probability of being in a low (relative to average OECD) growth state
Time series regressions on seven bi-partisan countries. t-statistics in parentheses.
Country Constant Lagged Dep.
Variable
DRPTN R2 D.W.
United States 0.02
(1.55)
0.73
(12.0)
0.08 (a)
(3.07)
0.67 2.08
Cernany 0.14
(3.31)
0.83
(16.9)
0.06 (a)
(1.59)
0.80 1.60
France 0.04
(1.65)
0.92
(23.9)
0.09 (b)
(2.10)
0.88 1.83
Australia 0.11
(3.04)
0.71
(10.4)
0.10 (c)
(1.83)
0.53 1.98
Canada 0.05
(2.01)
0.85
(16.7)
0.04 (b)
(0.71)
0.73 1.93
Sweden 0.13
(3.80)
0.62
(6.66)
0.05 (c)
(2.04)
0.51 1.96
United Kingdom 0.20
(4.68)
0.61
(7.73)
0.02 (b)
(0.81)
0.37 1.95
United Kingdom Cd) 0.20
(4.12)
0.58
(6.25)
0.06 (b)
(1.87)
0.41 1.83
(a) DRPT6
(b) DRPT4
(c) DRPT8
(d) 1970-1987 Sample27
6.Endogenous Elections
An empirical test of the model of Ito (1990a) is as follows. Define
as the probability that an election is called at time t and assume that an
election was held in period r and that, according to the law, an election has
to be held at least every n periods; Ito's model implies that > 0, i:l,2,3
in:
—o+ + — forr < t r+n (7)
Table 16 displays this probit regressions for every country in the sample
in which the timing of elections is endogenous. Following Ito (l990a) the
variable TL is defined as the number of quarters elapsed from the preceding
elections while the other two regressors are output growth and inflation.
The results for Japan, which do not reject the theory, are consistent-
with those of Ito (l990a,b). However, except possibly for Finland, no other
country in the sample supports the theory; in fact, there are at least as many
signs inconsistent with the theory as there are "correct" signs, even though
in either case they are all insignificant.
Several different specifications of (7) were estimated in addition to
that presented in Table 16. First, we used the economic variables
(y and ir) defined in difference from the world average. Second, we tried
various lag structures. Third, following Ito (l990b) we used different
measures of the time elapsed from the previous election; we defined
Tl — and12 —+O.OOt—(r—t)
and we tried both of them (each at a time)Table 16
Endogenous Timing Of Elections
Probit estimation. Dependent Variable: Election
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Country const Y TL R2
Australia -4.182 0.030 0.064 0.324 0.24
(-3.55) (0.40) (1.12) (3.55)
Austria -4.020 0.021 -0.116 0.280 0.38
(-3.10) (0.48) (-0.98) (3.16)
Belgium -3.001 0.022 -0.026 0.188 0.20
(-3.67) (0.40) (-0.31) (3.42)
Canada .2.447 0.049 0.026 0.073 0.07
(-3.40) (0.60) (0.42) (2.09)
Denmark -5.859 0.021 0.237 0.339 0.27
(-4.08) (0.26) (2.85) (3.73)
Finland -7.660 0.321 0.057 0.395 0.34
(-0.32) (1.91) (0.73) (2.38)
France -2.135 -0.148 -0.080 0.133 0.31
(-2.17) (-1.32) (-1.01) (2.40)
Germany -6.080 -0.097 0.105 0.387 0.41
(-3.53) (-1.00) (0.82) (3.22)
Ireland -2.132 -0.050 0.056 0.028 0.03
(-2.16) (-0.94) (1.05) (0.56)
Italy -7.515 0.041 0.107 0.359 0.33
(-3.19) (0.42) (1.61) (3.06)
Japan * -7.123 0.180 -0.139 0.487 0.38
(-3.34) (2.45) (1.31) (3.16)
Netherlands -2.649 -0.063 -0.026 0.149 0.22
(-3.59) (-1.30) (-0.35) (2.97)
New Zealand -163.97 1.67 0.108 13.939 0.91
(-0.04) (0.66) (0.47) (0.04)
UK -2.304 -0.172 -0.006 0.117 0.21
(-2.90) (-1.50) (-0.13) (2.66)
*ForJapan, the 1980:2 election was duminied out as in Ito (1990 a).28
instead of (r—t) in (7)23 The results of all theseregressions (available
upon request) confirm the results of Table 16.
These negative results should not beinterpreted as a rejection of the
basic, insightful idea of strategic choice of electiontiming, for several
reasons. First of all the economy is only one of thevariables which may
influence the choice of calling an election. Amajor success in foreign
policy, or various events affecting negatively thepublic image of the
opposition, may be strategically used by the incumbent.A careful study for
each country of the interaction of economicand non—economic factors would be
very valuable but goes beyond the scope of thepresent paper. Second, the
model of strategic timing of election isprobably more applicable to
countries, like Japan or the U.K.
,withunified control rather than coalition
governments. In fact, different members of coalition
governments may disagree
on the optimal time for calling an election, since
their expectations on their
relative popularity may diverge. Thus, inthis institutional structure, the
decision about when to call an election,appears much more as the result of a
non cooperative game between coalition members ratherthan an optimal
strategic decision of a unified government.
Finally, one may argue that,
particularly for the cases of weak coalitiongovernments, the reverse
causation may be also important:
governments collapse and elections have to
be called early, when theeconomy is doing poorly and the coalition cannot
agree on what to do (see Robertson (1983)). More
generally, in countries with
large coalitions and frequent elections (suchas Belgium, Italy, the
Netherlands) coalition collapses are probably the resultof more complex
politico—economic factors than the shortrun state of the economy.29
7. Conclusions
The most interesting result of this paper is that the more recent models
of political cycles significantly outperform their predecessors. The rational
"opportunistic" model by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and the rational partisan
model by Alesina (1987) are consistent with the overall pattern of results for
several countries.
The main finding of this paper can be summarized as follows:
1) With the exception of three countries (Germany and New Zealand and,
possibly, Japan), we found no evidence of a systematic opportunistic cycle of
the Nordhaus type either for output or unemployment.
2) The opportunistic political business cycle model with endogenous timing of
elections is rejected in every country, with the exception of Japan.
3) An electoral cycle on the inflation rate, consistent with the models of
budget cycles of Rogoff and Sibert (1988), was found.
4) The implications of the "rational partisan theory" are consistent with the
empirical evidence particularly for a subset of countries with a bi—partisan
system or at least with more clearly identifiable political changes from left
to right and vice—versa. This theory is less applicable, and in fact tends to
fail, in countries with large coalition governments with frequentgovernment
collapses.
5) The "partisan theory" with permanent effects on output andunemployment is
generally rejected.
Thus, a political cycle which seems to appear fairly consistently in
several countries is the following: left winggovernment expand the economy
when elected; for a while (about 2 years) they succeed, then inflation
expectations adjust and the economy returns to its natural rate of growth. At30
this point, left wing governments are trapped into the time consistent
equilibrium with an inflation bias alaBarro and Cordon (1983b). Note that
when left wing governments approach the new election in this high inflation,
they may try to reduce the latter, particularly if inflation is perceived as
the main economic problem of the time (Lindbeck (1976)). When rightwing
governments are elected they fight inflation, causing a recession or a growth
slowdown. Later in their term, the economy goes back at its natural rate of
growth and inflation remains low.
Two explanations can account for the relatively little evidence of a
Nordhaus type opportunistic cycle on growth and unemployment: First, a
"rational" electorate imposes a limit on this behavior; an excessive attempt
to pursue opportunistic policies may be perceived as counterproductive by
policymakers. Second, it may be quite difficult to create expansions
precisely timed before elections.
However, the results on post—electoral inflation increase may signal the
occurrence of pre—electoral opportunistic budget policies. Alesina (1989)
presents some qualitative evidence which suggests that budget deficits tend to
increase in election years in several countries. Evidence on budget cycles in
the US is discussed in Tufte (1978), Alesina (1988a), and Nordhaus (1989).
Preelectoral fiscal "favors" to key constituencies may be electorally very
useful and easy to implement, relative to an attempt to increase the rate of
growth of CNP.
These opportunistic monetary and fiscal policies may very well coexist
with the partisan cycles found in the data. Even "partisan" politicians
prefer to be in office, rather than out; by being in office they can implement
their desired goals. Thus, they may engage in short term pre—electoral31
opportunistic monetary and fiscal policies to enhance their chances for re-
election. Further research on a multi—country sample could shed more light on
this issue: in fact our results on inflation suggest that pre—electoral
manipulations of monetary and fiscal policy instruments may be the rule rather
than the exception.32
Footnotes
1.Furthermore, Nordhaus' "political business cycle" model did not receive a
convincing empirical support. Soon after the publication of Nordhaus' paper
Mccalluin (1978) and Paldam (1979) presented negative empirical results for the
U.S. and OECD economies respectively. More favorable results are shown by
Tufte (1978) on a sample including a few American elections.
2. By Okun's law the same model could be written in terms of the unemployment
rate.
3.To be precise, Nordhaus (1975) assumes that policymakers control aggregate
demand and, indirectly, inflation. This difference is inessential and, in
fact, the more recent models simplify the analysis by assuming that the
government has direct control over the inflation rate.
4. Nordhaus' (1975) model predicts that inflation should increase before the
election. However, given time lags between the effects of aggregate demand
policies on output and inflation, it is possible to construct a model of the
Nordhaus type in which inflation increases immediately after, rather than
before the election. (See Lindbeck (1976)).
5. In Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) the asymmetry of information is related to
the knowledge of the realization of a random shock to the economy.
6. Formally, the degree of competence is modelled by adding a term in
equation (1) which changes over time and is known by the policymaker but
becomes known to the voter only with a lag. For an explicit test of this
"competence" model on United States data see Alesina, Londregan and Rosenthal
(1990)33
7. Note that Nordhaus' PBC and Hibbs' PT can coexist. If one assumes that
politicians are both opportunistic and partisan and voters are retrospective
as implied by A:5, one obtains a "weaker" form of PT which incorporates
elements of pre—electoral opportunistic behavior. See Frey and Schneider
(1978) and Nordhaus (1989).
8. In the regressions for the seven countries included in the creation of the
proxy for the OECD averages, we have used different proxies which exclude the
country in the left—hand side of the regression.
9. A priori, the correct dynamic specification of the model could differ
across countries but in country by country regressions we found that the same
AR specification is the best for almost all the countries in the sample.
However, even if the same AR specification applies to each country, the
estimates of the coefficients on the dynamic part of the model could differ
across countries and suggest the use of a variable—slopes and variable—
intercepts model. Given the significant loss of degrees of freedom involved,
this procedure was not adopted. Furthermore, country specific results are
discussed in Section 4.
10. Ellis and Thoma (1989) present an extension of the partisan model for the
case of endogenous timing of elections.
11. It is known that in the case of dynamic fixed—effects panel models such
as the one estimated here, the correlation between the error term and the
lagged dependent variables might lead to potentially biased and inconsistent
estimates of the parameters of the model (see Hsiao (1986)). The problem is
quite serious in panel sets where the number of agents (N) considered is large
but the number of times series observations (T) is small (data over avery
short period of time) .Inthat case the maximum likelihood estimator of the34
dynamic model is inconsistent even if the number of agents becomesvery large
(see Anderson and 1jsiao (1982) and Nicke].l (1981)). The solution to this
problem is to use instrumental—variable methods such as those suggested by
Shargava and Sargan (1983) and Fakes and Griliches (1984). Our panel data
set, however, does not suffer of the above problem because of the use of a
long time series (usually 112 data points). As observed by Hsiao (1986), in
the case where the time period T over which data are available islarge, as in
our model, the parameter estimates of the standard fixed—effects dynamic model
are consistent.
12. Analogous results on the political dummy availableare obtained by using
as a dependent variable the difference between domestic and world growth.
13.The variable shows in fact a high level of persistence. Given this
persistence, even a "temporary" policy shock as the one captured by thedummy
DPRT6 has rather persistent effects.
14. One could add oil prices to the equation but the inclusion of theworld
inflation variable already proxies for this role of oil shocks.
15. The significance of the coefficients of the political dummies in Tables
1, 2 and 3 does not result from the influence ofany single country. If one
drops from the pull any of the 16 countries and retain the other 15, the
coefficients on the political dummies remain significant. These resultsare
available.
16. These results are availableupon request.
17. An even more extreme version of this model of voters'myopia would imply
that they ignore the influence of the worldeconomy on their countries'
performance and thus politicians simply attempt to expand their economies,
regardless of the world economy. This hypothesis can be tested running the35
same regressions of Tables 6, 7 without correcting for the effect of the world
economy. The results (available upon request) show no support for the PEC.
18. Results are available upon request.
19. Our results regarding the RPT theory on output growth and unemployment
are confirmed by another set of regressions in which we used a distributed lag
of the variable representing the changes in partisan regime, instead of the
DRPT variable. For the countries in which tables 9 and A—3 show a significant
DRPT effect we find that an F—test on the distributed lag variable rejects the
null hypothesis that the sumofall coefficients is equal to zero. These
results are available upon request.
20. See Nelson and Plosser (1982), Campbell and Mankiw (1987), Watson (1986),
Clark (1987), King, Plosser, Stock and Watson (1987).
21. Given our results in Table 9, Hamilton's tests on the other countries are
not likely to support the theory.
22. New Zealand is excluded from the sample because of lack of quarterly
data.
23. Tl is simply the number of quarters elapsed from the previous election as
a ratio of the maximum number of quarters between elections (i.e., n). T2 is
constructed such that it assumes a very high value (1000) when elections are
not anticipated. The idea is that the economy has no influence on the timing
in these cases (see Ito (1990b)).36
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TableA-i
Description of Data
Inflation:Inflation is obtained as: —[( - P4)/t-4)xloo
where Pis the Consumer Price Index in quarter t.For all countries the
sample is 1960:1, 1987:4, and CPI is taken from line 64 of IMF-IFS.
Output and Unemployment: Country-by-country sample and sources.
Note: Countries which use other measures of CDP do so because
real quarterly GDP is not available.
AUSTRALIA: GDP -realquarterly GOP from OECDMEI (1960:1-1987:4).
Unemployment -unemploymentrate -adjusted
-OECDMEI
(1965:1-1987:4).
AUSTRIA: GOP -realquarterly COP from IMF-IFS (1960:1-1987:4).
Unemployment -unemploymentrate -total-adjusted
-
OECDMEI(1969:1-1987:4).
BELGIUM: COP -quarterlyIndustrial Production from OECDMEI (1960:1-
1987:4).
Unemployment
-unemploymentrate -totalinsured -
adjusted
-OECDMEI(1960:1-1987:4).
CANADA: COP -realquarterly COP from IMF-IFS (1960:1-1987:4).
Unemployment -unemploymentrate -total-adjusted-
OECDMEI(1960:1-1987:4).
DENMARK: COP -realANNUAL CD? from IMF-IFS (1960:1-1987:4)
(converted into quarterly data by assuming that quarter-to-
quarter annual change corresponds to year-to-year change).
Unemployment -unemploymentrate -registered
unemployed -adjusted
-OECDMEI(1970:1-1987:4).
FINLAND: COP -realquarterly GDP from IMP-IFS (1970:1-1987:4).
Unemployment -unemploymentrate -total-adjusted
-
OECDMEI(1960:1-1987:4).
FRANCE: COP -realquarterly COP from IMP-IFS (1965:1-1987:4).
Unemployment -unemploymentrate -total-adjusted
-
OECDMEI(1967:1-1987:4).
GERMANY: COP -realquarterly COP from IMF-IFS (1960:1-1987:4).
Unemployment -unemploymentrate -adjusted
-OECDMEI
(1965:1-1987:4).
IRELAND: COP -quarterlyIndustrial Production from OECOMEI (1975:1-
1986:4).
Unemployment -unemploymentrate -adjusted
-OECDMEI
(1975:1-1987:4).Table A-l (continued)
ITALY: GOP -realquarterly GDP from 11fF-IFS (1960:1-1987:4).
Unemployment -unemploymentrate -adjusted
-OEGDMEI
(1960:1-1987:4).
JAPAN: GD? -realquarterly GD? from 11fF-IFS (1960:1-1987:4).
Unemployment -unemploymentrate -adjusted-OECDMEI
(1965:1-1987:4).
NETHERLANDS: GD? -quarterlyIndustrial Production from OEGDMEI (1960:1-
1987:4).
Unemployment -unemploymentrate -registered
unemployed -OECDMEI(1971:1-1987:4), no adjusted
available.
NEW ZEALAND: GD? -realANNUAL GD? from 11fF-IFS (1960:1-1987:4)
(converted into quarterly data by assuming that quarter-to-
quarter annual change corresponds to year-to-year change).
Unemployment -notavailable.
NORWAY: GDP -realANNUAL GD? from IMF-IFS (1960:1-1987:4)
(converted into quarterly data by assuming that quarter-to-
quarter annual change corresponds to year-to-year change).
Unemployment -unemploymentrate -adjusted
-OECDMEI
(1972:1-1987:4).
SWEDEN: GD? -realquarterly GD? from 11fF-IFS (1969:1-1987:4).
Unemployment -unemploymentrate -totalinsured -
adjusted
-OECDMEI(1969:1-1983:4).
SWITZERL.AND: GD? -realquarterly GD? form 11fF-IFS (1967:1-1986:4).
Unemployment -ratioof total unemployed to labor force
-adjusted
-OECDMEI(1974:4-1987:3).
UK: GD? -realquarterly GD? form Il-IF-IFS (1960:1-1987:4).
Unemployment -unemploymentrate -registered
-
civilian-adjusted
-OECDMEI(1960:1-1987:4).
USA: GD? -realquarterly GDP from IMF-IFS (1960:1-1987:4).
Unemployment -unemploymentrate -total-adjusted
-
OECDMEI(1960:1-1987:4).Table A-2
Election and Regime Change
£ —Election;CH L —ChangeLeft; Ch R —ChangeRight
AUSTRALIA: Endogenous Timing, 3 YESAUSTRIA:Endogenous Timing, 4 YES
1961:4£RIGHT a 1959:2 £ RIGHT c
1963:4£ 1962:4 £
1966:4£ 1966:1 £ CE R
1969:4 £ 1970:1 £ CH L
1972:4 E CH L 1971:4 £ (*)
1974:2 E (*)b 1975:4 £
1975:4 E CR R 1979:2 £
1977:4£ 1983:2 £ CH R c
1980:4£ 1986:4 £ CH R
1983:1 £ CH L
1984:4 £ (*)
1987:3 £
BELGIUM: £ndogenàus Timing, 4 'IRS CANADA:Endogenous Timing, 5 YRS
1961:1£ RIGHT 1962:2 £ RICET
1965:2E 1963:2 £ CE L (*)
1968:1£ CH L 1965:4 £
1971:4£ 1968:2 £
1973:1 CH R 1972:4 £
1974:1£ 1974:3 £ (*)
1977:2E CH L 1979:2 £ CE R
1978:4£ (*) 1980:1 £ CE L (*)
1981:4£ CR R 1984:3 £ CE R
1985:4 £ CE L
1987:4£
DENMARK: Endogenous Timing, 4 YRS FINLAND:£ndogenous Timing, 4 YRS
1960:4£ LEFT 1962:1 £ LEFT
1964:3E 1963:4 CE R
1966:4£ 1966:1 £ CH L
1968:1£ CR R (*) 1970:1 £
1971:3£ CH L 1972:1 £
1973:4£ CH R 1975:3 £ CE R
1975:1£ CH L (*) 1977:2 CH L
1977:1£ 1979:1 £
1979:4£ 1983:1 £ CE R
1981:4£ 1987:1 £ CliR
1982:3 CH R
1984:1£
1987:3ETable A-2 (continued)
FRANCE: Endogenous Timing, 5 YRS GERMANY:EndogenousTiming, 4 YRS
1962:4H RIGHT 1961:3 E RIGHT
1967:1E 1965:3 E
1968:2E (*) 1966:4 CH L c
1973:1E 1969:3 H CH L
1978:1 E 1972:4 E CR R
1981:2E CR L 1976:4 E
1984:3 CR R 1980:4 E
1986:1E CR R 1982:4 CH R
1983:1 E
1987:1 E
IRELAND: Endogenous Timing, 5 YRS ITALY:Endogenous Timing, S YRS
1961:4E RIGHT RIGHT
1965:2E 1962:4 CR L
1969:2E 1963:2 E
1973:1E CH L 1968:2 E
1977:2E CR R 1972:2 E
1981:2E CH L 1974:4 CH R
1982:1E CR R (*) 1976:2 E CH L
1982:4E CH L (*) 1979:2 E
1987:1E 1983:2 E
1987:2 E
JAPAN: Endogenous Timing, 4 YRS NETHERLANDS:EndogenousTiming, 4 YRS
1960:4E RIGHT 1959:1 E RIGHT
1963:4 E 1963:2 E
1967:1E 1965:2 GH L
1969:4E 1967:1 E CR R
1972:4E 1971:1 H
1976:4E 1972:4 H (*)
1979:4E 1973:2 CR L
1980:2E (*) 1977:2 E
1983:4E 1977:4 CR R
1986:3 E 1981:2 E CR L
1982:3 E CH R (*)
1986:2 ETable A-2 (continued)
NEW ZEALAND: Endogenous Timing, 3 YRSNORWAY: Exogenous Timing, 4 YES
1960:4£ RIGHT 1961:3 £ LEVI
1963:4E 1965:3 £ CH R
1966:4£ 1969:3 £
1969:4E 1971:4 CH L
1972:4£ CE L 1972:4 CR R
1975:4£ CE R 1973:3 £ Cl-I L
1978:4£ 1977:3 E
1981:4£ 1981:3 £ CE R
1984:3£ CR L 1985:3 £
1987:3£ 1986:2 CR L
SWEDEN: Exogenous Timing, 3 YES SWITZERLAND: Exogenous Timing,
since late 60s, constitutional reform 4 YRS
1960:3£ LEFT 1959:4 E RIGHT
1964:3£ 1963:6 £
1968:3£ 1967:4 £
1970:3£ 1971:4 £
1973:3£ 1975:4 E
1976:3£ CE R 1979:4 E
1979:3£ 1983:4 E
1982:3£ CR L 1987:4 E
1985:3£
UK: Endogenous Timing, 5 YES USA: Exogenous Timing, 4 YES
RIGHT
1959:4£ RIGRT 1960:4 E CR L
1964:4£ CR L 1964:4 £
1966:1£ (*) 1968:4 £ CR R
1970:2 £ CR R 1972:4 £
1974:1 £ 1976:4 E CH L
1974:3E CH L (*) 1980:4 £ CR R
1979:2£ CR R 1984:4 £
1983:2£
1987:2E
a RIGHT or LEFT indicates the type of government in power at the beginning of
the sample which is 1959:1. We also indicate for each country whether
elections dates are endogenous or exogenous and the official number of years
between two elections.
b Elections denoted with an asterisk "*"arenot included in tests of the
political business cycle theory because they are too close (less than two
years) to previous elections. They are however included in tests of the
opportunistic endogenous election model -
cBoth Germany and Austria had grand coalitions of Left and Right parties.
Thus, a finer administration variable was used in the RPT inflation and
partisan (Ribbs) regressions. This also explains the occurence of a rightward
shift from an already central Right leaning party.Table A-2 (continued
Source: Election Dates are obtained from Banks (1989); dates of changes of
government and their classification of "Right" and "Left" are obtained from
Alt (1985) and Banks (1989).T
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 Table A-S
Partisan Theory (HibbF
Dependent Variable: u
(t-statistics in parentheses)
DIF onst u Country C -i
DIF U ADM t-2 (j) R2 D.W.
U.S. 0.145 1.504 -0.582 0.027 (-2) 0.93 1.91
(2.42) (18.93) (-7.19) (0.97)
U.K. 0.006 1.334 -0.364 0.052 (-1)0.972 1.98
(0.17) (14.61) (-3.95) (1.19)
Belgium 0.036 1.541 -0.542 0.016 (-1)0.996 2.15
(1.03) (18.85) (-6.56) (0.56)
Italy 0.062 1.181 -0.225 -0.081 (-2) 0.922.13
(0.92) (12.40) (-2.31) (-1.19)
Canada 0.051 1.284 -0.326 -0.050 (-2)0.937 2.02
(0.82) (14.17) (-3.54) (-1.45)
Finland -0.050 1.370 -0.423 0.071 (-3)0.945 2.05
(-0.90) (15.63) (-4.81) (1.79)
Germany* -0.034 1.521 -0.566 0.120 (-1)0.990 1.88
(-1.07) (17.75) (-6.70) (3.25)
Australia 0.015 1.248 -0.275 0.016 (-2)0.951 2.08
(0.40) (12.06) (-2.64) (0.42)
Austrja* -0.539 1.037 -0.228 0.169 (-1)0.870 1.93
(-3.62) (8.83) (-2.19) (2.29)
Denmark 0.056 1.449 -0.483 0.031 (-1)0.975 2.05
(1.38) (13.78) (-4.64) (0.79)
Netherlands 0.210 0.910 0.074 0.029 (-2)0.975 1.98
(2.09) (7.27) (0.59) (0.29)
orway -0.383 1.008 -0.102 -0.004 (-3)0.856 1.96
(-1.75) (7.57) (-0.77) (-0.07)
Ireland 0.075 1.666 -0.667 -0.004 (-2)0.996 1.98
(1.00) (13.90) (-5.48) (-0.08)
Sweden -0.178 1.427 -0.475 -0.033(l)0.959 1.97
(-1.93) (15.22) (-5.01) (-0.95)
France 0.047 1.483 -0.492 -0.024 (-2) 0.98 1.97
(1.21) (14.64) (-4.73) (-0.61)
*In order to maintain consistency with the RPT inflation regressions,we used
ADM for Germany and Austria.